Recently, applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems have gained popularity. In many such allocation problems, such as river games, queueing games and auction games, the game is totally positive (i.e., all dividends are nonnegative), and there is some hierarchical ordering of the players. In this paper we introduce the Restricted Core for such games with ordered players which is based on the distribution of dividends taking into account the hierarchical ordering of the players. For totally positive games this solution is always contained in the Core, and contains the well-known Shapley value (being the single-valued solution distributing the dividends equally among the players in the corresponding coalitions). For special orderings it equals the Core, respectively Shapley value. We provide an axiomatization and apply this solution to river games.
Introduction
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game, which assigns to every subset of players or coalition a worth that these players can earn by cooperation. A solution for TU-games assigns a set of payoff vectors (possibly empty or consisting of a unique element) to every TU-game. In a payoff vector provided by a solution, the payoff assigned to a particular player depends on the payoffs that can be obtained by any coalition of players. The best-known single-valued solution is the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) , the best-known set-valued solution is the Core (Gillies, 1953) .
In many economic allocation problems there is some hierarchical ordering of the players. For example, in the water allocation problem of Ambec and Sprumont (2002) agents are located along a river from upstream to downstream, in queueing games as considered in Maniquet (2003) the players can be ordered by their waiting cost, in sequencing situations as considered in, e.g. Curiel et al. (1989) the players (jobs) are ordered in an initial queue, in the auction situations of Graham et al. (1990) the agents can be ordered by their valuations of the good to be auctioned, and in the airport game of Littlechild and Owen (1973) the airplanes can be ordered by the cost of the landing strip necessary to build for these airplanes. Therefore, in this paper we assume that the players in a TUgame are part of some hierarchical structure that is represented by a directed graph. In such games with ordered players the payoff assigned to a player may depend on both the worths of the coalitions as well as the position of the player in the graph. In van den Brink et al. (2006) a solution for such games with ordered players is introduced that is based on distributing the Harsanyi dividends (see Harsanyi, 1959 ) of a game in the spirit of the Harsanyi set or Selectope. The Harsanyi set, see Vasil'ev (1978 Vasil'ev ( , 1981 and Vasil'ev and van der Laan (2002) , assigns to every TU-game all Harsanyi payoff vectors, being those payoff vectors that are obtained by distributing every dividend in any possible way among the players in the corresponding coalition. An alternative definition of this set is given by the Selectope of a TU-game, see Hammer et al. (1977) and Derks et al. (2000) , defined as the convex hull of all selectope vectors, where the selectope vectors are those vectors where every dividend is fully assigned to one player of the corresponding coalition. In case all dividends are nonnegative the Harsanyi set coincides with the Core of the game and thus consists of all efficient, group stable payoff vectors.
For games with ordered players, van den Brink et al. (2006) modified the Harsanyi set by requiring that for any coalition and for any two players i and j within a coalition, player i gets a share in the dividend of the coalition that is at least as high as the share of player j, if player i is a superior of j in the ordering of the players. Obviously, because this puts restrictions on the distributions of the dividends, for every game with ordered players this modified Harsanyi set is a subset of the Harsanyi set of the game without ordering on the players. In case all dividends are nonnegative it follows that this modified Harsanyi set yields a refinement of the Core. Therefore, on this class of games with ordered players we refer to this modified Harsanyi set as the Restricted Core. For this class of games the Restricted Core is non-empty and generalizes both the Core and the Shapley value. In particular, for any directed graph the Shapley value of the game (without taking account of the ordering on the players) belongs to the Restricted Core, and it is the unique element of this set if the ordering is complete, i.e., every player dominates every other player in the sense that in the directed graph representing the ordering there is a directed arc from each player i to every other player j. On the other hand, the Restricted Core is a subset of the Core of the game (without ordered players), and it equals the Core in case the directed graph representing the ordering is empty, i.e. no player dominates any other player.
For the class of games with ordered players and nonnegative dividends, we provide a characterization of the Restricted Core solution as the maximal (with respect to set inclusion) solution that satisfies the well-known efficiency, null player, additivity and nonnegativity properties, and a structural monotonicity property which reflects the hierarchical aspect of games with ordered players. By adding three more axioms, namely nonemptyness, convexity and a consistency property, we obtain a full axiomatization with eight logically independent axioms.
We argue that the Restricted Core yields a reasonable set of payoff vectors for economic allocation problems that have an underlying ordering of the players. For example, van den Brink et al. (2007) show that the solution proposed by Ambec and Sprumont (2002) for sharing the water in a river among the agents that are located along that river from upstream to downstream, is counterintuitive since it allocates the nonnegative dividends of cooperation fully to the most downstream agents in the corresponding coalitions, while the upstream players have control over the water flow. Applying the Restricted Core on the ordering from upstream to downstream allocates these dividends in such a way that upstream agents get a share that is at least equal to the share of downstream agents in the dividends 1 .
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss some preliminaries on TUgames and define the class of games with ordered players. In Section 3 we discuss the water distribution problem of Ambec and Sprumont (2002) as a motivating example. In Section 4 we formally introduce the Restricted Core. We also show some of its properties. Section 5 provides characterizations of the Restricted Core solution. In Section 6 we introduce and 1 Similar, for sequencing situations, Fernández et al. (2005) introduce a drop out monotonic solution that assigns dividends fully to that player of the corresponding coalition who is last in the queue, while the Restricted Core on the ordering from first to last assigns to players earlier in the queue a share in the dividend at least equal to that of later players.
characterize a further refinement of the Restricted Core, the Restricted Selectope which is a solution for games with ordered players that is defined in line with the Selectope and assigns to any game with ordered players a (possibly empty) subset of the Restricted Core. In Section 7 we argue that the Restricted Core provides a reasonable solution for the water distribution problem. The final remarks in Section 8 conclude the paper.
Preliminaries

TU-games
A cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game, is a pair (N, v) , where N = {1, ..., n} is a finite set of n players, and v: 2 N → R is a characteristic function on N such that v(∅) = 0. For any coalition S ⊆ N , v(S) is the worth of coalition S, i.e., the members of coalition S can obtain a total payoff of v(S) by agreeing to cooperate. Since we take the player set N to be fixed, we represent a TU-game by its characteristic function v and we denote the collection of all TU-games on N by
A special class of TU-games are the unanimity games. Let Ω N = 2 N \{∅} denote the collection of all nonempty subsets of N. Then, for T ∈ Ω N , the unanimity game u T on N is given by u T (S) = 1 if T ⊆ S, and u T (S) = 0 otherwise. Writing v as a (2 n −1)-dimensional vector with the worths of the 2 n − 1 nonempty coalitions in Ω N as its components, it is well-known that for every TU-game v, there exist unique weights 
for T ⊆ N (see Harsanyi (1959) ). So, the dividend of a singleton is equal to its worth while, recursively, the dividends of all other coalitions are equal to their worth minus the dividends of all proper subcoalitions. In this sense the dividend of a coalition might be considered as the synergy earnings of cooperation of the coalition that were not yet realized by its proper subcoalitions. For a collection of games G ⊆ G N , a set-valued solution F on G assigns a set
assigns precisely one payoff vector f(v) ∈ R n to every v ∈ G. Examples of set-valued solutions are the Core and the Harsanyi set (or Selectope). The Core (Gillies, 1953) of TU-game v ∈ G N is the set of all efficient payoff vectors that are stable in the sense that no coalition can do better by separating, and is given by
As known, the Core of a game is nonempty if and only if v is balanced, see e.g. Bondareva (1962) or Shapley (1967) . Since every convex game is balanced and every totally positive game is convex, it follows that the Core is nonempty on G N + . The Harsanyi set (Vasil'ev 1978 of v ∈ G N is the set H(v) of payoff vectors obtained by distributing the dividend of any coalition T ∈ Ω N in any possible way among the players in T . For T ∈ Ω N , the set of sharing vectors p T ∈ IR n + is defined as
and a sharing system is a tuple
Then every sharing system p = [p T ] T ∈Ω N yields the corresponding Harsanyi payoff vector of game v given by
i.e., the payoff to player i is given by the sum of its shares in the dividends of the game. The Harsanyi set H(v) is the collection of all Harsanyi payoff vectors, thus
It should be noticed that the Harsanyi set of a game is equal to its Selectope, as introduced in Hammer et al. (1977) , see also Derks et al. (2000) .
A TU-game v is called totally positive if all dividends are nonnegative. (finite totally positive games, as well as their infinite analogs, were introduced in Vasil'ev (1975) ; for more details see Vasil'ev (1981 Vasil'ev ( , 2006 
2 In fact, every almost positive game is convex, where a game is almost positive if the dividends of all coalitions with at least two players are nonnegative.
3 In fact, for every v ∈ G N it holds that H(v) = Core(v) if and only if v is almost totally positive.
Further, for every v ∈ G N , H(v) contains the Shapley value of v and thus is nonempty.
Also all marginal value vectors of a game v are contained in H(v). The Shapley value (Shapley (1953) ) is the single-valued solution Sh:
So, for every game v the Shapley value yields the Harsanyi payoff vector that is obtained by taking the sharing vectors p T given by p
for all i ∈ T and every T ∈ Ω N , and
Alternatively, the Shapley value is defined as the average of all marginal value vectors over all permutations of the players. For a permutation π: N → N , assigning rank number π(i) ∈ N to any player i ∈ N , we define π i = {j ∈ N|π(j) ≤ π(i)}, i.e., π i is the set of all players with rank number at most equal to the rank number of i, including i itself. Then the marginal value vector m π (v) ∈ IR n of game v and permutation π is given
For convex games each marginal value vector lies in the Core of the game. For every game each marginal vector lies in the Harsanyi set. More precisely, for permutation π and coalition T ∈ Ω N , let i(T ) be the player in T such that
) for all j ∈ T , i.e., i(T ) is the player in T with the highest rank number. Then m π (v) ∈ H(v) is the Harsanyi payoff vector corresponding to the sharing system Derks et al. 2006) .
Games with ordered players
In this paper we assume the players to be part of a hierarchical structure that is represented by a directed graph. A directed graph or digraph is a pair (N, D) where N = {1, ..., n} is a finite set of nodes (representing the players) and D ⊆ N × N is a binary relation on N . We assume D to be irreflexive, i.e., (i, i) ∈ D for all i ∈ N. The collection of all (irreflexive) binary relations on N is denoted by D N . Observe that D is a collection of ordered pairs.
Since we take the finite set N to be fixed, we represent a digraph on N by its collection D of ordered pairs. For i, j ∈ N , a path between i and j in D is a sequence of different nodes 
i.e., when, in the ordering i is a predecessor of j (and thus j a successor of i). Observe that we allow that D contains cycles, so that it is possible that a player i 1 has a successor i 2 , i 2 has a successor i 3 and so on to some player i m that is a predecessor of i 1 . If m = 2, then i 1 is a predecessor of i 2 and i 2 of i 1 . Although one might argue that an order should satisfy certain properties, for instance the ordering is a hierarchical structure without cycles, in this paper we refer to any structure that is represented by a digraph as an order, including the empty digraph D = ∅ and the complete digraph D = {(i, j) | i, j ∈ N, i = j}. We already remark here that the characterization results in Sections 5 and 6 will hold for any subclass E ⊆ D N of digraphs, so also if one restricts to acyclic structures, rooted trees, and even to classes of digraphs that consist of only one digraph.
solutions that do not take into account the ordering of the players are for instance
of totally positive games with ordered players, in Section 4 we introduce a solution that distributes the Harsanyi dividends in such a way that higher ordered players get at least the same share in a dividend than lower ranked players in the corresponding coalition.
In the next section we first discuss a motivating example of a totally positive game with ordered players. We conclude this subsection with a few further notions on directed graphs. For
there is a path (i 1 , . . . , i m ) between i and j such that {i 1 , . . . , i m } ⊆ T , i.e., between every two nodes in T there is a path in D that only contains nodes of
implies that i ∈ S, i.e., for every player j in S also all predecessors of j are in S. A set S is complete in D when S is connected and comprehensive from above in D. Finally, for nonempty T ⊆ N , we denote C T D as the set of complete subsets of T in the subgraph (T, D(T )).
The water distribution problem
In their paper 'Sharing a river', Ambec and Sprumont (2002) consider the problem of the optimal distribution of water to agents located along a river from upstream to downstream. Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of players representing the agents on the river, numbered successively from upstream to downstream, and let e i ≥ 0 be the flow of water entering the river between player i − 1 and i, i = 1, . . . , n, with e 1 the inflow before the most upstream player 1. Further it is assumed that each player has a quasi-linear utility function given by
where t i is a monetary compensation to player i, x i is the amount of water allocated to player i, and b i : IR + → IR is a continuous nondecreasing function yielding the benefit b i (x i ) to player i of the consumption x i of water. An allocation is a pair (x, t) ∈ IR n + × IR n of water distribution and compensation scheme, satisfying
The first condition is a budget condition and says that the total amount of compensations is nonpositive, i.e., the compensations only redistribute the total welfare. The second condition reflects that any player can use the water that entered upstream, but that the water inflow downstream of some player can not be allocated to this player. So, for any j, the sum of the water uses x 1 , . . . , x j is at most equal to the sum of the inflows e 1 , . . . , e j . Because of the quasi-linearity and the possibility of making money transfers, an allocation is Pareto optimal (efficient) if and only if the distribution of the water streams maximizes the total benefits, i.e., the optimal water distribution x * ∈ IR n + solves the maximization problem:
e i , j = 1, . . . , n, and
A welfare distribution allocates the total benefits of an optimal water distribution x * over the players, i.e., it is a vector z ∈ IR n assigning utility z i to player i and satisfying
Clearly, any welfare distribution z can be implemented by the allocation (x, t) with
. . , n. The problem to find a 'fair' welfare distribution can be modelled by the following game (N, v). Obviously, the worth v(N ) is given by
a solution of the maximization problem (3.1). Further, for any pair of players i, j with j > i it holds that water inflow entering the river before the upstream player i can only be allocated to the downstream player j if all players between i and j cooperate, otherwise any player between i and j can take the flow from i to j for its own use. Hence, a coalition T is admissible if and only if T is a coalition of consecutive players along the river, i.e., T = {i, i + 1, . . . , j}. In the sequel we denote such a coalition of consecutive players by
. . , j, and
For any other (non-consecutive) coalition S it holds that v(S) is equal to the sum of the worths of its maximal consecutive subsets 4 . We refer to this game as the river game. In the sequel we take the following assumption from Ambec and Sprumont (2002) .
Assumption 3.1 In the river game every benefit function b i : IR + → IR is differentiable with derivative going to infinity as x i tends to zero, strictly increasing and strictly concave.
Under this assumption the river game is a totally positive game. This follows from the following more general result. We say that a TU-game v ∈ G N is a line-graph game on linear order (1, 2, . . . , n) if for every coalition S ⊆ N it holds that v(S) equals the sum of the worths of all maximal consecutive subsets of S, see Greenberg and Weber (1986) . Note that this is equivalent to saying that the dividend of every nonconsecutive coalition is zero, see e.g. Owen (1986) and Bilbao (1998) . It turns out that for this class of games, convexity is equivalent to totally positiveness. Proof. It is known that a totally positive TU-game is convex. So, we only have to show that for line-graph games also the reverse holds. Therefore, let v be a convex line-graph game with v({i}) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N. From v({i}) ≥ 0 it follows that ∆ v ({i}) ≥ 0, i ∈ N . In van den Brink et al. (2007) it is shown that the dividend of a consecutive coalition S = [i, j] consisting of at least two players, is given by
As stated already above, any nonconsecutive coalition has zero dividend. So, v is totally positive.
Although an arbitrary convex game v does not need to be totally positive, Proposition 3.2 shows that for line-graph games these properties are equivalent. Under Assumption 3.1, Ambec and Sprumont (2002) have shown that the river game is convex. Clearly, the river game is also a line-graph game on the linear order (1, 2, . . . , n) and thus Proposition 3.2 applies. Further recall from Proposition 2.1 that H(v) = Core(v) when v is totally positive. So we have the following corollary.
Corollary 3.3 Let v be the river game associated to a water distribution problem with benefit functions satisfying Assumption 3.1. Then v is totally positive, ∆ v (T ) = 0 if T is nonconsecutive, and H(v) = Core(v). Ambec and Sprumont (2002) propose as solution for the water distribution problem the vector m u (v), being the marginal value vector m π with respect to the permutation π(i) = i for all i ∈ N , i.e., the vector given by m
. . , n. They show that this is the unique payoff vector that is both core-stable (i.e., lies in the Core) and fair. This fairness property means that no coalition S gets a payoff above its aspiration level, defined as the maximum worth S can attain by an optimal distribution among its members of the water inflows of all players 1, . . . , s, where s = max{h|h ∈ S}, so also using the water inflows of the players not in S, but upstream to the most downstream member of S. So, the fairness property requires that the total payoff to coalition [i, j] Although core-stableness and fairness seem to be reasonble properties, the unique outcome resulting from these two properties is quite counterintuitive. For every i < n, we have that the total payoff of the player in the consecutive coalition [i, j] upstream of i (including i itself) is equal to v([1, i]), while the total payoff to the downstream coalition 
) for all i = 1, . . . , n − 1. Maybe assigning every dividend to the most upstream player in the coalition is also too extreme (of course, not more extreme than assigning it to the most downstream player), but since any upstream coalition [1, i] can prevent that any downstream coalition [i + 1, n] gets more than v([i + 1, n]) by distributing all its water inflows among themselves, it seems to be reasonable that for two players h and k in a consecutive coalition T , the share of player h in the dividend of coalition T is at least equal to the share of k when player k is located downstream to player h.
In the next sections we will see that the latter outcomes are indeed obtained by applying the Restricted Core for games with nonnegative dividends (which is the solution introduced in this paper) to the river game. Therefore, we consider the linear ordering D given by
in which the players along the river are ordered from upstream to downstream, and consider the game with ordered players (v, D), where v is the totally positive river game given by (3.1) and (3.2). So D represents the situation that any player j needs the cooperation of its upstream neighbor i = j − 1 to receive water from its upstream players 1, . . . , j − 1. Observe that a coalition S is connected in D if and only if S is a coalition [i, j] of consecutive players. Therefore, only connected coalitions in D have a nonzero dividend in the river game. The Restricted Core consists of all payoff vectors obtained by requiring that, for every consecutive coalition [i, j] , the share of player h ∈ [i, j −1] in the dividend of coalition [i, j] is at least equal to the share of it downstream neighbour h+1. Since for totally positive games every allocation obtained by distributing the dividends belongs to the Core of the game, by restricting the way in which the dividends are distributed we obtain a refinement of the Core.
The Restricted Core
In this section we propose a solution F on the class G In Example 4.2 the Restricted Core of the game with ordered players appears to be a subset of the Core of the original game. Moreover, the Shapley value of the unrestricted game belongs to the Restricted Core. Both these facts hold in general. 
with (i, j) ∈ D. Take v = u {i,j} and let e j ∈ IR N be given by e j j = 1 and e j h = 0 for all h ∈ N \ {j}. Then e j ∈ RC(v, D), but e j = Sh(v).
, where the latter equality follows from v ∈ G N + . Only if Suppose that D = ∅, i.e., there exist i, j ∈ N, i = j, with (i, j) ∈ D. Again, take v = u {i,j} and consider e j ∈ IR N .
Then e j ∈ Core(v) although e j ∈ RC(v, D).
To find the extreme points of RC(v, D), the following theorem from van den Brink et al. (2008) is useful and will be applied later. For S ⊆ N, let a S ∈ IR n be the vector with components a 
Characterization of the Restricted Core
We first state four axioms for a solution F on G 
Recall that a player
satisfies x i = 0, whenever i is a null player in v.
The next axiom reflects the ordering of the players within the digraph. Since the players payoffs should depend on their contributions in the game v as well as their positions in the digraph D, we cannot say that players should always earn at least as much as their successors. However, if a player vetoes one of its successors, then we require that this vetoing predecessor earns at least as much as its vetoed successor 7 . Player i vetoes player j ∈ N \ {i} in game v if v(S) = v(S \ {j}) for all S ⊆ N \ {i}, i.e., i vetoes j if the marginal contribution of j to any coalition not containing i is equal to zero.
The next lemma says that each coalition containing j but not i has zero dividend when i vetoes j. Proof. RC satisfying efficiency, the null player property, additivity and nonnegativity follows similar as this is shown for corresponding properties of the Harsanyi set solution H for TU-games on G N in Vasil'ev and van der Laan (2002) . To show structural monotonicity,
So, in all cases we have that
T j for all T , structural monotonicity is satisfied.
Next we show that on the class of totally positive games with ordered players the Restricted Core solution is the maximal (with respect to set inclusion) solution that satisfies the five axioms mentioned above.
N satisfies efficiency, the null player property, additivity, nonnegativity and structural monotonicity, then
, the null player property implies that x i = 0 for all i ∈ N \ T , and efficiency implies that i∈T x i = ∆ v (T ). With nonnegativity it follows that x i ≥ 0 for all i ∈ T . Since i, j ∈ T veto each other in u T , structural monotonicity implies that
Notice that the proofs of the Theorems 5.2 and 5.3 also hold on any subset of digraphs E of D N , and thus the results hold for any solution on any subclass G , and structural monotonicity requires unanimity symmetry (i.e., in a unanimity game all players of the unanimity coalition earn the same). In this case we obtain a characterization of the Shapley value for totally positive TUgames as the unique solution satisfying efficiency, the null player property, additivity and unanimity symmetry. Notice that in this case the nonnegativity axiom (although satisfied by the Shapley value) is superfluous in the characterization. We obtain a full axiomatization of the Restricted Core solution if we add the following three axioms, of which the first two are standard in game theory.
The last property is a consistency property. First, we define the coalitional proxy game of a coalition T with respect to a subset R of T . In this game the coalition R ⊆ T acts as a proxy for T in the sense that the dividend of a coalition T is assigned to its subset R by giving every player in R an equal share in the dividend of T . This yields the coalitional proxy game v R,T given by
for every S such that T ⊆ S, and v(S) = v(S) otherwise. Note that v R,T (N ) = v(N), and thus any efficient solution distributes the same amount in games v and v R,T . The next lemma follows by straightforward calculation of the dividends and is given without proof.
Lemma 5.5 For T ⊆ N and R ⊆ T the dividends of game v R,T are given by
otherwise.
The lemma shows that coalition T is a 'null coalition' in game v R,T , in the sense that its dividend is zero, while the dividends of all single players in R are increased with a fraction 1 |R| of the dividend of T . We now state the coalitional consistency property. Recall that C T D is the collection of subsets of T that are complete (i.e., connected and comprehensive from above) in the subgraph (T, D(T )) of (N, D).
This property 9 says that by allocating the dividend of a coalition T equally among the players of any complete subset R of that coalition T, we do not obtain new payoff vectors in the solution. Going from a game v with ordered players to the coalitional proxy game v R,T with R ∈ C T D and the same ordering of the players, we do not yet assign payoffs to the players, but we allocate one of the coalitional dividends to singleton dividends. Considering this as a partial solution, the consistency requirement states that the payoff vectors assigned to the new game should also be payoff vectors in the original game.
To prove that RC(v, D) is characterized by the eight axioms stated above, we first state three lemmas. Proof. Let x ∈ F (u T , D). Then, from efficiency it follows that i∈N x i = 1 and by nonnegativity we have that x i ≥ 0, i ∈ N. From the null player property we have that
Finally, from structural monotonicity we obtain that for any two players i, j ∈ T with (i, j) ∈ D it holds that
In the proof of the next lemma we apply Theorem 4.5 on the extreme points of P T D .
Lemma 5.7 Let F be a solution on G N + × D N satisfying nonemptyness, convexity, efficiency, the null player property, additivity and coalitional consistency. Then for any
Proof. It follows from Lemma 5.5 that for R ⊆ T the game w R,T = (u T ) R,T satisfies
From the nonemptyness, efficiency and the null player property it follows that for any D,
Finally, with Theorem 4.5, convexity implies that
Lemma 5.8 Let F be a solution on G N + × D N satisfying nonemptyness, convexity, efficiency, the null player property, additivity, nonnegativity, structural monotonicity and coalitional consistency. Then for any D ∈ D N , T ∈ Ω N and c > 0, we have that
Proof. For c = 1, the statement follows immediately from Lemmas 5.6 and 5.7. For positive c = 1 it follows from the fact that the set of extreme points of cP We now come to a full axiomatization of the Restricted Core. 
We end this section by showing logical independence of the eight axioms in Theorem 5.9 using the following alternative solutions on
satisfies all axioms except convexity.
3. Solution F E given by F E (v, D) = µRC(v, D) for some positive µ = 1, satisfies all axioms except efficiency. RC(v, D) , for some µ, 0 < µ < 1, satisfies all axioms except the null player property. (v) , where N(v) is the set of non-null players in v. Solution F A given by
For game
satisfies all axioms except additivity.
6. For some ǫ > 0, define
axioms except nonnegativity.
7. Solution F SM given by F SM (v, D) = Core(v) satisfies all axioms except structural monotonicity.
8. Solution F CC given by F CC (v, D) = {Sh(v)} satisfies all axioms except coalitional consistency.
The Restricted Selectope
The Selectope, introduced by Hammer et al. (1977) is a solution for TU-games that is equivalent to the Harsanyi set, and thus yields an alternative definition of this solution, see also Derks et al. (2000) . For totally positive games the selectope thus yields another definition of the Core. First, a selector chooses for every coalition a particular player in the coalition to whom to assign the dividend of that coalition, i.e., a selector is a function α: Ω N → N such that α(T ) ∈ T for all T ⊆ N . The selectope vector corresponding to selector α and game v ∈ G N is the vector s α (v) ∈ R n given by s α i (v) = {T ∈Ω N |α(T )=i} ∆ v (T ) and assigns the dividend of any nonempty coalition T fully to the player α(T ) from this coalition that is selected by the selector α. The Selectope S(v) of v then is the convex hull of all selectope vectors, i.e.,
Now, if the players are ordered according to digraph D ∈ D N then we put as a restriction on a selector that the dividend of a coalition should always be assigned to a player that has no predecessors in the coalition. Formally this is done by considering only selectors in the set
We obtain the following definition. 
The Restricted Selectope solution also satisfies an alternative structural monotonicity property which requires that a vetoed player earns zero payoff.
payoff vector x ∈ F(v, D) satisfies x j = 0 whenever there is some i ∈ N \ {j} such that both (i, j) ∈ D and j is vetoed by i in v.
A similar requirement for simple TU-games is discussed by Napel and Widgrén (2001) . Note that the structural monotonicity property and the strict structural monotonicity property do not imply one another. Replacing in Theorems 5.2 and 5.3 the structural monotonicity property by the strict structural monotonicity property, we obtain characterizations of the Restricted Selectope solution on the class G (ii) If solution F on G N + × D N satisfies efficiency, the null player property, additivity, nonnegativity and strict structural monotonicity, then
Proof. (i) The Restricted Selectope solution S satisfying efficiency, the null player property, additivity and nonnegativity follows similar as for the Harsanyi set H for TU-games in G N in Vasil'ev and van der Laan (2002) . Further it follows straightforward that S satisfies strict structural monotonicity.
(ii) Suppose that solution
T ∈ Ω N , the null player property implies that x i = 0 for all i ∈ N \T , and efficiency implies that i∈T x i = ∆ v (T ). With nonnegativity it follows that x i ≥ 0 for all i ∈ T . Strict structural monotonicity implies that 
The water distribution problem reconsidered
Applying the Restricted Core to the totally positive game with ordered players (v, D) associated with a water distribution problem as described in Section 3, we obtain exactly the set of allocations described at the end of that section. We illustrate this with an example.
Example 7.1 Consider the water distribution problem among players N = {1, 2, 3}, such that e 1 = 1, e 2 = e 3 = 0, b 1 (x) = 0, b 2 (x) = 0 and b 3 (x) = x for all x ≥ 0. So, the only water inflow is at the most upstream player 1, while the most downstream player 3 is the only one that obtains a positive benefit from water consumption. Player 2 has neither a water inflow nor positive benefit from water consumption, but is needed to let water pass from player 1 to player 3. The corresponding river game is the unanimity game of the 'grand' coalition given by v(N ) = 1, and v(S) = 0 otherwise. The Core is the full set of efficient nonnegative payoff vectors Core(v) = {z ∈ IR ) ⊤ }), see Figure 2 . This is also a subset of the Core with three extreme points. One of these extreme points is the allocation m l (v) assigning the dividend fully to the most upstream player 1. This is also the unique element in the corresponding Restricted Selectope. Note that the Shapley value, which distributes the worth equally among the three players, is an extreme point of the Restricted Core corresponding to both orderings. We want to stress that our critique on the solution m u of Ambec and Sprumont (2002) is the modeling, i.e., ordering the players from downstream to upstream. As shown in the example above, the Restricted Core can be applied to this ordering (yielding the solution m u as one of its extreme points), but also to the reverse ordering from upstream to downstream, yielding the marginal value vector m l as one of its extreme points. For any ordering the Shapley value always is an extreme point of the Restricted Core.
Final remarks
In this paper we assumed that there is an ordering on the players in a totally positive cooperative TU-game. This ordering restricts the payoff distribution in the game and we propose the concept of the Restricted Core as solution concept for such situations. This Restricted Core provides a collection of Core payoff distributions obtained by taking into account the ordering when distributing the dividends. Theorem 4.3 states that the Restricted Core is a subset of the Core of the unrestricted game which always contains the Shapley value of the unrestricted game. We also provided axiomatic characterizations.
As a further refinement we discussed the Restricted Selectope which assigns to any totally positive game with ordered players a subset of the Restricted Core, but is empty if the ordering contains a cycle. Many economic applications are modelled by totally positive TU-games such as sequencing games (see, e.g. Curiel et al. (1989) ), auction games (see Graham et al. (1990) ), airport games (see Littlechild and Owen (1973) ), telecommunication games (see van den Nouweland et al. (1996) ) and queueing games (see Maniquet (2003) ). We gave special attention to river games arising from water distribution problems. We saw that the solution proposed by Ambec and Sprumont (2002) is the unique element in the Restricted Selectope taking the ordering from downstream to upstream, and is an extreme point of the corresponding Restricted Core. As an alternative we suggested the Restricted Core corresponding to the ordering of the players from upstream to downstream.
In a similar way, one can obtain the hierarchical outcomes for (communication) graph restricted games as introduced in Demange (2004) . For communication graph games, Myerson (1977) introduced the restricted game where to every coalition one assigns the sum of the worths of all its components (i.e. maximally connected subsets) in the graph 11 .
Given a cycle free undirected communication graph Demange (2004) associates with every node a directed tree obtained by choosing that node as the root, and for each of these directed trees considers the marginal value vector of the restricted game corresponding to orders where 'lower ranked' players enter before 'higher ranked' players. For every directed (rooted) tree this hierarchical outcome is the unique element of the corresponding Restricted Selectope corresponding to this tree and the restricted game. Another game theoretic model in which players in a TU-game belong to a hierarchical structure are the games with a permission structure as considered in Gilles et al. (1992) , Gilles and Owen (1994) , van den Brink and Gilles (1996) and van den Brink (1997) 12 . In these games it is assumed that players need permission from other players before they are allowed to cooperate within a coalition. So, instead of restricting payoff distributions, in games with a permission structure the cooperation possibilities are restricted 13 . Given the sets of feasible coalitions, a restricted game is defined which assigns to every coalition the worth of its largest feasible subset. We want to stress that the approaches of restricted cooperation (as in games with a permission structure) and restricted payoff distribution (as done in the underlying paper) are essentially different. For totally positive games, the Restricted Core is a subset of the Core of the unrestricted game and therefore refines the concept of Core. In the models of restricted cooperation possibilities, the Core of the restricted game is larger than the Core of the original game.
